Reagan Confronted European Left, Secured NATO Missile Deterrent

The writer recalls watching Cold War politics shape public opinion in the late 1980s, notes how parts of the Western left sympathized with communism, and argues that today’s Western European reluctance to face threats like Iran in the Strait of Hormuz reflects the same arrested development — an unwillingness to shoulder security responsibilities that the United States cannot always carry alone.

I started paying attention to politics in the late 1980s during President Ronald Reagan’s second term, when the Soviet Union still posed a genuine, systemic threat. At home and abroad, debates about nuclear deterrence and the deployment of intermediate-range missiles energized crowds and political movements. Those debates exposed deep divisions in Western societies about how to respond to aggressive totalitarian regimes.

Many on the left in the U.S. and Western Europe openly sympathized with communist causes or, at minimum, opposed strong responses to Soviet aggression. Antinuclear movements spread across NATO countries, and social-democratic parties embraced disarmament rhetoric that often aligned with Soviet strategic interests. That posture complicated allied cohesion at the very moment collective security mattered most.

A contemporary description of that era captured the public anxiety and organized protest: “The Reagan administration commitment to a nuclear buildup and loose talk of nuclear war triggered widespread public anxiety and an outburst of popular protest. In the United States, the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign drew broad public support and won backing from the Democratic Party. Antinuclear agitation was particularly heated in Western Europe. Focused primarily on U.S. deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles in Western Europe (planned for late 1983) and Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe (which had already begun), massive disarmament demonstrations erupted. In nearly every West European country, antinuclear groups mushroomed into mass movements, and were supported by social-democratic political parties.”

That pressure pushed Washington at times to soften its posture or appear conciliatory just to avoid alienating NATO partners. Critics argued the administration traded firmness for diplomatic cover, and that allowed Moscow to exploit economic and political openings. Some decisions meant to reassure European publics ended up rewarding regimes that threatened allied security.

It’s important to remember that Soviet communism was an oppressive, often violent system with little respect for human rights or democratic norms. The regime backed proxy conflicts, sponsored subversion abroad, and cultivated a military posture designed to dominate neighbors and challenge the West. To label such behavior benign is to ignore decades of coercion and brutality.

Communism distorted incentives and centralized power, producing poverty for most while enriching the elite. Whatever utopian language some leftist intellectuals used could not hide the coercion, censorship, and lack of basic liberties that defined the lived reality under Soviet rule. Educated observers understood the threat, even when protesters chose not to.

Watching those mass protests as a conservative teenager, I saw European protesters as spoiled and dependent: public voices demanding protection from the United States while rejecting the measures that made that protection credible. They enjoyed the security umbrella but balked at the costs, much like teenagers who accept parental support but resist responsibility. That disconnect undermined alliance burden-sharing when it mattered most.

Today’s crises show similar patterns. The Strait of Hormuz sits at the heart of global trade and is especially critical for European energy and commerce. Iran’s regime lashes out at shipping and asserts control over the waterway when it feels threatened, actions that violate international norms and endanger neutral vessels. Those attacks echo past behavior that historically drew forceful responses to preserve freedom of navigation.

The modern hesitation among several European governments to join robust, immediate security measures highlights the same arrested development seen in the Cold War era. As one recent summary noted, “Trump has asked European and Gulf partners to take a more immediate role in ensuring passage through the strait — even threatening to exit the NATO alliance over their lack of help. Key allies have pushed back, arguing that deeper involvement in Iran must wait until the danger subsides. ‘This is not our war. We will not be drawn into the conflict,’British Prime Minister Keir Starmer said Wednesday, stressing that the priority remains ‘diplomatic and political measures’ to restore safe transit.”

Several NATO members have restricted access to bases and airspace in ways that complicate allied responses, signaling reluctance to be drawn into kinetic operations. Such refusals strain the alliance and force the United States to reassess who will genuinely share the burden of collective defense. That reassessment should factor in capability, willpower, and a willingness to confront threats rather than defer indefinitely to diplomacy alone.

The lesson that endures is straightforward: security requires more than rhetoric. Allies must be prepared to bear risk and cost, not just demand reassurance from partners who remain willing to act. Nations that expect protection but reject responsibility weaken collective deterrence and invite opportunistic aggression.

U.S. strategy should prioritize cooperation with capable, willing partners and be realistic about friends who consistently avoid burden-sharing. In a world where maritime chokepoints and regional aggressors matter, alliances succeed when members contribute meaningfully to shared defense and uphold the rules that keep trade and peace flowing.

History shows the cost of indifference and the price of soft-pedaling threats for political convenience. If Western Europe wants lasting security, it must grow out of its teenage phase and take on the responsibilities commensurate with its economic and political status.

To convince the Europeans that we were not the warmongers that European peace protesters were making us out to be, the Reagan Administration adopted a less confrontational policy toward the Soviet Union. Thus when the Russians shot down Korean Air Lines flight 007, brutally murdering hundreds of innocent passengers, President Reagan responded with empty rhetoric. When the Europeans issued subsidized credit to Moscow to finance the Siberian gas pipeline, Mr. Reagan backed off his earlier threats to impose sanctions against the Western Europeans. And it is Mr. Reagan who has given Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski (the Polish communist leader) undeserved international respectability – and desperately needed sub-sidized credit – by agreeing to Poland’s membership in the International Monetary Fund.