This article covers Judge James Boasberg’s order requiring the administration to bring back Venezuelan nationals designated as members of Tren de Aragua so they can contest their removals under a proclamation invoking the Alien Enemies Act, explains the court’s reasoning on jurisdiction and mootness, quotes the judge’s findings about inadequate process, and describes the remedy the court ordered while noting that an appeal seems likely.
The case concerns 252 Venezuelan men removed in mid-March after a proclamation that invoked the Alien Enemies Act, who were flown to El Salvador and held at the Terrorism Confinement Center. Some were later returned to Venezuela, but a group of them sued, arguing their removal happened without meaningful process and thus violated due process protections. Judge James Boasberg recently granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, certified a class, and denied the administration’s motion for summary judgment.
Boasberg’s opinion focuses on two threshold issues before reaching the merits: whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction and whether the plaintiffs’ claims were moot after their release and repatriation. The judge concluded the court retained jurisdiction because the United States had constructive custody of the plaintiffs while they were held at CECOT, and that the case was not moot because the designation and removal carry continuing consequences. Those consequences include bans on entry and residence and potential property actions tied to the designation.
From a Republican perspective, national security and executive authority are important, yet those priorities do not eliminate the need to follow constitutional process. The administration acted under a proclamation meant to address a real threat, but the court emphasized that designating people as alien enemies without giving them a meaningful chance to contest that designation raises serious constitutional problems. The opinion does not deny the government’s interest in security; it insists on basic procedural safeguards before irreversible steps are taken.
Boasberg’s written reasoning distilled into two main legal findings: first, the constructive custody theory supports jurisdiction because the men were effectively under U.S. control at the time they filed their amended complaint; second, the plaintiffs’ claims were not mooted by release because the harms stemming from the designation persist long after repatriation. Those are factual and legal observations the judge used to keep the case alive and move to the merits of due process.
On the merits, Boasberg’s conclusion is blunt and rooted in prior Supreme Court guidance about notice and opportunity to challenge. The court put it this way: “The merits of Plaintiffs’ due-process claim are easily resolved. Even if the AEA was properly invoked as a general matter, it is beyond cavil that designated “alien enemies” under that act must be afforded some process to contest their designation. Here, Plaintiffs received none. They were not told of their designation or informed that they could challenge it before being loaded onto planes and shipped out of the United States mere hours after Proclamation 10903 was made public. The Supreme Court has unequivocally affirmed that in circumstances like these, “notice roughly 24 hours before removal, devoid of information about how to exercise due process rights to contest that removal, surely does not pass muster.” Other courts have consistently required that detainees receive an opportunity spanning days — not hours — to file a habeas petition challenging their designation before deportation. By any measure, the detainees surely fell victim to constitutionally inadequate process.”
That quoted passage is the heart of the ruling: regardless of the government’s authority under a wartime or national security statute, courts have consistently required more than a few hours’ notice and no meaningful opportunity to challenge a designation. The judge framed the deficiency as constitutional, not merely procedural, and pointed to precedent that expects detainees to have days rather than hours to pursue habeas relief in comparable situations.
As a remedy, the court ordered the administration to propose within two weeks how it will either facilitate the plaintiffs’ return to the United States to contest their designations in person or provide a hearing from abroad that satisfies due process. The judge left room for a remote process if it truly meets constitutional standards, but made clear that mere paperwork or token procedures would not suffice. The requirement to articulate a concrete plan forces the executive to choose a path that actually allows meaningful challenges.
From here, an appeal is nearly certain given the stakes: the administration will likely argue that the invocation of the Alien Enemies Act and related national security considerations justify different treatment, while challengers will insist on the procedural protections the court described. Republicans who prioritize strong borders and security will expect the administration to defend the proclamation vigorously, but even they should recognize that securing the nation includes respecting legal limits and preserving constitutional process.
The ruling will shape how future designations and removals are handled, balancing immediate security steps against the need to provide people a realistic chance to contest labeling that carries long-term consequences. For now, the order forces a practical choice for the government: return the plaintiffs for hearings or devise a constitutionally sufficient process from afar, and likely take the matter to appellate courts to resolve the tension between security and due process.
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