New ‘European NATO’ Proposal Is Earning a Lot of Mockery

The U.S. built European security and paid for it for decades, and now a former NATO chief wants Britain and France to lead a NATO-like European defense without American help—a notion that many on the right find laughable, dangerous, and out of touch with reality.

For decades the American military posture in Europe provided a deterrent that kept the peace, and that reality shaped how allies approached their budgets and commitments. NATO members agreed in 2006 to spend at least 2 percent of GDP on defense, yet too many failed to meet that pledge until pressure from a commander-in-chief willing to demand fair burden sharing. That pressure changed the conversation, and it forced some allies to finally shoulder more of their own defense costs.

President Donald Trump pushed those allies harder than recent predecessors did, insisting they stop freeloading while benefiting from American forces and nuclear guarantees. In return, some European capitals grumbled about our priorities and kept importing energy from hostile powers even as the U.S. kept the shield up for them. That contradiction—expecting American protection while underinvesting and making risky economic choices—left many conservatives skeptical about any plan that suggests America should simply step aside.

Relations frayed further when certain allies begrudged overflight rights and basing support needed for operations like Epic Fury against Iranian aggression, actions that raised real questions about mutuality. If American forces are stationed in a country, they should be able to use those facilities to defend shared interests. When allies limit access or stall decisions, the U.S. faces the choice of accepting diminished freedom of action or moving assets to friendlier ports and bases.

Given those tensions, the administration explored options to rebalance commitments without an outright illegal withdrawal, including repositioning forces to nations willing to cooperate. The law constrains a president from unilaterally abandoning treaty obligations, but practical measures can send a strong message and protect U.S. interests while demanding reciprocity. Conservatives argue those steps are prudent when allies exhibit unreliable behavior and fail to invest adequately in their own defense.

So when Anders Fogh Rasmussen floated the idea of a Britain- and France-led European defense grouping, voices here reacted with sarcastic incredulity. Rasmussen imagines a parallel arrangement to take up conventional defense duties in Europe, expanding what he calls the Coalition of the Willing into a kind of European-only NATO. In essence, he wants to keep NATO while creating a backup plan that leaves the U.S. on the sidelines.

Mr Rasmussen has suggested expanding the Coalition of the Willing – an alliance of 35 countries set up to defend Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire – so it can take over Europe’s conventional defence role.

He identified France and Britain as the leading members of an expanded alliance, citing their nuclear capabilities as a key factor. 

That idea drew sharp, terse commentary from conservatives online, with Sen. Mike Lee capturing the tone for many when he posted, “Your terms are acceptable.” The message was clear: if Europe wants to run its own defense, fine—just handle the bills, the logistics, and the risks without American backup. Fair warning, though—words like that ring hollow unless matched by real capability and consistent funding.

Publicly advocating both a new European defense construct and continued NATO membership reveals Rasmussen knows European militaries are not yet fully ready to go it alone. He is trying to paper over capability gaps with political creativity rather than confronting the underlying problem: insufficient will and resources. Conservatives view that as a fantasy solution that dodges the hard truth—strong defense requires sustained investment, not clever rebranding.

Critics point out the gulf between past prestige and present reality for the UK and France. Britain once boasted the world’s premier navy, but years of cuts and neglect have taken a toll, leaving fleet readiness a frequent point of alarm. France, meanwhile, faces its own institutional and political challenges that undercut the idea it can lead a broad continental defense effort without American muscle.

If Paris and London were truly ready to fill the gap, they would have demonstrated a steadier appetite for forward deployments and decisive action during recent crises. Instead, their public posture has often been cautious and hedged, with lots of talking and little immediate follow-through. That kind of behavior undermines confidence on both sides of the Atlantic and strengthens the case for Washington to press allies to meet their commitments.

The bottom line for conservatives is blunt: Europe benefits from American security leadership and should not assume U.S. patronage without reciprocal burdens. Proposals to build a European detachment that absolves America of responsibility look appealing to some idealists but ignore practical realities on the ground. Allies need to step up, fund their militaries, and prove they can act decisively before anyone seriously contemplates trimming the U.S. role in European defense.