The Treasury moved again to choke off financial and logistical networks tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps by sanctioning multiple companies and individuals that allegedly support Mahan Air and related IRGC activity, naming entities in China, India, Russia, and Iran and warning that U.S. jurisdictional assets will be seized.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced new OFAC designations targeting six entities and individuals for assisting the IRGC through travel services, logistics, and financial support tied to Mahan Air. The move is aimed squarely at the airline’s global agents and supporting firms that allegedly mask military logistics as civilian commerce. The administration framed these steps as part of a broader strategy to squeeze the regime without committing U.S. ground forces. That approach prioritizes hitting the cash and transport lines that keep Iran’s proxies and UAV programs moving.
Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating six entities and individuals in China, India, Russia, and Iran, including multiple companies serving as general sales agents for the U.S.- and European Union‑sanctioned Iranian airline Mahan Air. Although Mahan Air presents itself as a civilian carrier, it has long played a central role in enabling the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), providing travel services for IRGC‑Qods Force personnel, facilitating military training, and supporting Iran’s procurement and transport of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems and weapons.
“Those who provide financial services, logistics, or commercial support to the IRGC or Mahan Air are helping sustain a terrorist enterprise,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “Treasury will continue to identify them, expose them, and cut them off from the U.S. financial system.”
Under the designations, OFAC can block and seize property and interests that are within U.S. jurisdiction, cutting named parties off from dollar clearing and other financial lifelines. For a regime that relies on covert trade and creative shipping routes, targeted financial pressure can be decisive. Republican foreign policy voices argue this is the kind of pressure that produces results while minimizing the risk of U.S. troop commitments. The goal is decisive economic pain that isolates the IRGC and disrupts its operational reach.
The named network includes a China-based general sales agent identified as Shanghai Wings International Logistics Co and associated managers, who are accused of moving electronics and coordinating travel for Mahan Air. Other agents listed include an India-based travel agency and a Russian cargo broker described as functioning as GSA partners for the airline. The designations also single out a Tehran-based tech concern accused of enabling IRGC targeting, described as a front that gave operatives access to online tools used to select and strike targets.
Shanghai Wings, Tang Xin, Skiez Travels, and Air Cargo Pro are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Mahan Air. Shanghai Elite is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Tang Xin.
These firms are described by OFAC as the grease that keeps Iran’s courier lines lubricated: ticketing, cargo arrangements, procurement routes and corporate structures that blur the line between commercial and military use. The Treasury framed the step as cutting off tools used to move personnel and materiel, including UAV systems. Conservatives point out that targeting middlemen is smart strategy; you shut down the pipeline rather than chasing every single shipment.
The sanctions list also includes a Tehran-based startup studio accused of hosting web services that allegedly enabled IRGC actors to submit targeting requests. OFAC called that entity an IRGC-affiliated front that supported Iran’s “kinetic targeting” in the ongoing conflict. That kind of cyber-adjacent support is increasingly important to disrupt because it speeds targeting and coordinates attacks across theaters, making logistics and digital services equally relevant targets for pressure campaigns.
By sanctioning entities that help sustain Mahan Air’s global operations, today’s action further disrupts the network underpinning Iran’s destabilizing activities across the region. This action advances Treasury’s efforts to intensify economic pressure on the Iranian regime and the IRGC, particularly in response to its reckless attacks against regional states and commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. OFAC is also sanctioning an IRGC‑affiliated front company that has supported Iran’s kinetic targeting during the ongoing conflict.
The practical effect of these designations is to limit Iran’s ability to move people, parts, and weapons under the cover of civilian travel and trade. That outcome matters because it constrains Tehran’s capacity to arm proxy groups and to strike ships or bases in the region. Republican policy makers stress that this pressure supports deterrence and reduces the need for direct military intervention. Keeping economic choke points closed to the IRGC undercuts its reach and raises the costs of its aggression.
Editor’s Note: Thanks to President Trump and his administration’s bold leadership, we are respected on the world stage, and our enemies are being put on notice.
Add comment