This article examines how key NATO partners, especially the United Kingdom, reacted during Operation Epic Fury and argues that political hesitation and legalism undercut allied defense cooperation when Iran launched missile and drone attacks on civilians and allied forces.
Does being a European ally of America still mean anything? Recent events around Operation Epic Fury raise that question sharply, as several NATO countries initially denied access to bases and offered rhetoric that sounded more sympathetic to Tehran than to U.S. and Gulf partners. Those actions left allies scrambling while American and Israeli forces carried much of the immediate burden of countering Iranian attacks.
Spain’s leadership provided a prominently public rebuke, accusing the United States of violating “international law,” a stance that signaled political distance at a moment when simple logistical cooperation was all that was sought. That kind of posture from nations that rely heavily on U.S. defense commitments looks like a betrayal to partners who expected practical support instead of legal lectures.
Most frustrating was the conduct of the United Kingdom, long billed as America’s closest ally. Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s government initially refused requests for basing and declined to mobilize defensive forces in the run-up to Iran’s strikes, even as British nationals in the Gulf were placed in danger. Those refusals were not framed as operational incapability but as political and legal choices, and that distinction matters.
Eventually the British National Security Council reversed course, but the delay cost precious time and strained relations with Gulf partners who felt abandoned when Iran’s missiles started landing near civilians and military personnel. The reversal came only after allied pressure increased and Iran’s attacks escalated to the point of striking hotels and civilian sites in Dubai and Bahrain.
Embedded reporting quoted a former official describing the reaction: “Jordan was ‘fucking furious,’ … ‘The Emiratis, Kuwaitis, and even the Canadians are all asking, ‘What the fuck are you doing? Whose side are you on?’’” That anger was directed at a government that had been asked only for defensive support to protect populations, not to join offensive operations.
New disclosures from inside the British NSC show that initial requests for basing and the deployment of defensive assets were denied for explicitly political reasons. Ministers debated legalities and party optics while missiles were in the air, and those debates framed military decisions in partisan terms instead of national-security terms.
This time the NSC agreed that the basing request be granted. Downing Street’s official line is that the situation changed when Iran began firing missiles at hotels and other civilian sites in Dubai and Bahrain. An attack on the Bahraini capital Manama narrowly missed killing British military personnel stationed there. But it is also the case that Starmer and his ministers were shocked by the undiluted fury of their Middle East allies that more had not been done to protect them. Jordan was “fucking furious,” a former minister with friends in Amman says. “The Emiratis, Kuwaitis, and even the Canadians are all asking, ‘What the fuck are you doing? Whose side are you on?’” The Emiratis pointed out that Britain was failing to help protect the 240,000 British citizens living in Dubai and Abu Dhabi.
Officials quoted inside Westminster described a showdown between security pragmatists and ministers more interested in legalistic objections and political signaling toward the United States. “Reeves and Miliband made it quite difficult for the Prime Minister,” and some ministers focused on whether closer cooperation with Washington was politically advantageous for their party rather than whether it was necessary to defend people under attack.
Starmer was supported by John Healey, the Defense Secretary, but “Reeves and Miliband made it quite difficult for the Prime Minister.” The discussion came down to the legality and whether “a positive relationship with the United States of America was a good thing right now for the party. And many people concluded that it was not.” When asked what role the Labour defeat in the Gorton and Denton by-election played, because the Green party mobilized Muslim voters, a close aide of Starmer says: “Zero.”
But security sources are clear that Miliband, in particular, took a “petulant, pacifist, legalistic and very political” approach, questioning why the UK should support the US. “He fundamentally doesn’t like Trump, and he doesn’t like this Iran thing,” one says. As Labour leader in 2013, Miliband thwarted attempts by David Cameron to bomb Syria after the Assad regime used chemical weapons; many in Westminster regard this as a shameful episode. “He probably thinks it was a success,” the source adds.
At the heart of the British hesitation is a law-first mindset embodied by the attorney general, whose cautious legal advice reportedly carried the weight of policy. Critics inside government described Lord Hermer’s approach as turning legal opinions into de facto directives, limiting ministers’ willingness to act swiftly to protect citizens and allies.
Ministers, officials and military officers all regard Hermer as an impediment to Britain’s national security – both because of his doctrinaire approach to international law and because he reinforces Starmer’s legalistic instincts. “Bring back Suella!” says a member of the National Security Secretariat – a reference to the former attorney general Suella Braverman, who asserted parliamentary sovereignty over international treaties.
“Every senior minister receives legal advice,” says the former defense secretary Ben Wallace. “It is advice, it is not direction. However, under this government, Lord Hermer has become the power in the land where his advice becomes the rule.” A former mandarin adds: “There’s a lot of frustration in the professional national security gang because they feel that Hermer is essentially running the entire policy.”
From a Republican perspective, allies that lean on American military power while shrinking their own capabilities and punting when asked for help cannot be treated the same way. When nations underuse their fleets and ground forces and then invoke legal niceties instead of providing basic defensive support, that damages the trust that alliances depend on.
The central point is straightforward: defensive cooperation during a crisis should not be hostage to domestic party politics or doctrinaire legalism. When civilians and allied service members are threatened, practical, immediate support should come first, and political debates can follow once people are safe.
Editor’s Note: For decades, former presidents have been all talk and no action. Now, Donald Trump is eliminating the threat from Iran once and for all.
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