The U.S. carried out Operation Absolute Resolve to seize Nicolás Maduro, and that move reshuffles power in Latin America, complicates Beijing’s investments and energy plans, and forces Washington to decide how to secure Venezuelan oil while managing regional instability and foreign actors.

Operation Absolute Resolve, China’s Strategic Predicament in Latin America, and What Comes Next

On Saturday, a precise U.S. operation removed Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela’s narco-terrorist dictator, and his wife, Cilia Flores, from power and set criminal proceedings in motion. The mission was fast, surgical, and designed to send a clear signal about American resolve in the hemisphere.

The move is part of a broader push to reassert the Monroe Doctrine’s core idea: the Western Hemisphere should be free from coercive foreign influence and under U.S. security priorities. That strategic posture is aimed squarely at limiting external powers from establishing footholds capable of threatening the homeland.

Maduro’s capture is a severe blow to Beijing’s plans in the region and a headache for Chinese economic and strategic planners. China’s late-2025 white paper signaled an appetite to expand influence across Latin America, but the sudden collapse of Maduro’s protection ruins a lot of carefully laid groundwork and exposes vulnerabilities in Beijing’s approach.

Venezuela became central to China’s Belt and Road ambitions and to its regional military reach, with ties deepened over two decades. Beijing extended loans and bought oil, turning Venezuela into one of China’s largest debtors in the hemisphere and a key energy supplier for Chinese refiners.

China has loaned more than $60 billion to Venezuela over the years, and the country accounted for roughly 80 percent of Venezuelan oil exports at peak. Venezuela currently owes China an estimated $13 to $15 billion under loans-for-oil deals, and Operation Absolute Resolve leaves the fate of that debt unclear and Beijing’s balance sheet exposed.

The disruption also cuts into China’s energy options. Venezuelan crude once made up a meaningful share of Chinese imports, and the oil quarantine now places pressure on Chinese refiners that had grown dependent on that supply. With shipments at a standstill, Beijing has fewer alternatives and rising strategic exposure.

Smaller Chinese teapot refineries that make up about a quarter of China’s refining capacity are especially at risk, since many relied on heavy Venezuelan crude. Iran and other sources could offset some losses, but those supply lines are fragile and politicized, leaving Beijing with limited room to maneuver.

Cuba’s worsening fuel shortages and the possibility of internal collapse are another headache for China, since the island hosts Chinese intelligence and other facilities. The CCP has simulated combat scenarios near Cuba in recent years, and the loss of Cuban facilities would shrink Beijing’s regional presence and complicate long-term planning.

Hours before the raid, Maduro met a high-level Chinese delegation to sign hundreds of bilateral agreements, underscoring how entwined the two partners had become. The timing of the operation was deliberate, designed to embarrass Beijing and demonstrate U.S. capability and political will on China’s doorstep.

Wu Xinbo, dean of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, had the following to say:

The United States took such action at a time when China’s delegation was visiting Venezuela. For China, it is very embarrassing.

Chinese military kit underperformed during the operation, notably a JY-27A radar system that failed to detect U.S. aircraft, which raises questions about the battlefield reliability of Chinese weapons. That technical failure reinforces the view that American military tools and training remain dominant in decisive engagements.

Beijing’s muted response—no military rescue for Maduro—mirrors its inaction during other surprise U.S. operations, showing limits to Chinese willingness or ability to project force when it counts. Adversaries often posture loudly, but when faced with immediate, credible U.S. action, coordination among them breaks down.

What comes next in Venezuela is the pressing strategic question. The administration has spoken of securing oil and guiding a transition, and there are public commitments to take control of sanctioned heavy crude and use proceeds in ways that align with U.S. interests.

The interim leadership in Caracas claims cooperation, and promises have been made that Venezuelan oil revenue will buy American products, but timelines remain vague and trust is thin. Political loyalties run deep, and figures like Delcy Rodriguez and Diosdado Cabello are unlikely to be reliable partners.

U.S. officials have hinted that failure to cooperate could invite further action, including military deployments to secure oil fields if necessary. That deterrent posture is intended to pressure local actors while discouraging outside powers from interfering.

Multiple hostile elements remain in place: Cuban military and intelligence personnel, Hezbollah networks, pro-Maduro colectivos, cartels, a loyalist military faction, and foreign-backed insurgents. Any fragmentation of regime remnants risks sparking guerrilla conflict and deeper regional instability, a situation Beijing could exploit to its advantage.

China will likely redouble political warfare and influence operations to split the Venezuelan opposition and muddy international responses, following long-standing CCP playbooks. U.S. policymakers need to expect asymmetric and covert moves designed to blunt American gains and preserve Beijing’s interests wherever possible.