The 5th Circuit has dismissed the controversy over the Alien Enemies Act and Tren de Aragua as moot after a long procedural fight, leaving no precedential ruling on whether the AEA justified the removals and sparking sharp concurrences arguing for deference to the President on national security matters.
This case began when President Trump invoked the Alien Enemies Act in March 2025 to remove members of Tren de Aragua. Petitioners filed for habeas relief in the Northern District of Texas, and the dispute quickly escalated through the courts. The Supreme Court sent questions back to the 5th Circuit, directing it to assess likelihood of success on the merits and what process the AEA requires before removal.
The path through the courts was chaotic and fast-moving, including emergency filings and overnight decisions that drew public attention. A three-judge 5th Circuit panel initially ruled against the administration in September 2025, concluding the government had not shown an “invasion or predatory incursion” under the statute. Judge Andrew Oldham strongly disagreed, arguing such determinations fall within executive authority rather than judicial review.
The administration sought rehearing en banc, which the 5th Circuit granted and vacated the panel opinion, setting the stage for full-court argument in January 2026. While the court proceedings unfolded, the government removed the three named petitioners under the Immigration and Nationality Act instead of the AEA, a move the Supreme Court had said the government was free to make. That pivot is the key to the jurisdictional problem that followed.
Because the petitioners were already removed under the INA and not under the AEA, their request for an injunction to prevent AEA removals could no longer provide relief. The central injury the petitioners sought to cure had disappeared, and the case slipped into mootness. On Thursday the full 5th Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on that basis.
Several judges offered additional opinions. Judge James Ho concurred in the dismissal but urged the court could and should have resolved the preliminary-injunction merits first. He argued that judicial restraint was appropriate in assessing presidential determinations under the AEA and would have ruled for the administration on the merits.
Nothing in the AEA indicates that the judiciary should question Presidential determinations regarding the war power. To the contrary, the Act expressly authorizes its use on a “public proclamation” by the President. Deference to the invasion determination is also especially appropriate given that the AEA empowers the President, not only where there is an ongoing invasion, but even if the invasion is only “attempted or threatened.” Judges are ill-suited to question such national security assessments by the President.
The Supreme Court confirmed this approach in Ludecke. The President had invoked the AEA against enemy aliens from Germany during World War II—a “declared war.” But active hostilities had already ended three years earlier. Germany had unconditionally surrendered. The Court nevertheless refused to second guess the President. After all, “[t]hese are matters of political judgment for which judges have neither technical competence nor official responsibility.” 335 U.S. at 170. It was not for the judiciary to “question a belief by the President that enemy aliens” had not “los[t] their potency for mischief.” Id. “Such great war powers may be abused,” but “that is a bad reason for having judges supervise their exercise.” Id. at 172. “The Founders in their wisdom made him not only the Commander-in-Chief but also the guiding organ in the conduct of our foreign affairs.” Id. at 173. So “full responsibility for the just exercise of this great power may validly be left where the Congress has constitutionally placed it—on the President of the United States.” Id.
Judge Ho listed three takeaways he would have reached on the merits: the President’s AEA determination deserves deference, courts should not substitute their judgment on whether a situation counts as an invasion or predatory incursion, and the government’s revised seven-day notice satisfied due process. Those points reflect a deference-first stance toward executive judgment on national security matters.
Judge Oldham also filed a short concurrence, referring to his earlier detailed dissent from the panel decision and reiterating that he would prefer to decide the merits and deny the injunction on that basis. He acknowledged the practical reality here: with no live parties remaining to receive relief, denial by dismissal is the outcome the court must accept. That outcome leaves unanswered the larger statutory question the Supreme Court sent the circuit to resolve.
The sequence of events is notable: the Supreme Court tasked the 5th Circuit to answer whether the AEA authorized removal and what process it required, a panel initially answered against the administration, en banc rehearing erased that answer, and then jurisdiction evaporated when the named petitioners were removed under a different statute. The net result is that the 5th Circuit now lacks a precedential merits ruling on whether the AEA was lawfully invoked in this instance.
From a conservative viewpoint, this result is frustrating because it leaves an important separation-of-powers and national security question unresolved. The concurrences that argued for deference highlight longstanding concerns about courts substituting themselves for political branches when presidents act in defense of the country. But the procedural posture of this case means those arguments did not become the court’s ruling.
The legal tug-of-war here shows how process choices, emergency filings, and tactical statute switches can determine whether courts get to decide big constitutional questions. In this instance, the litigation consumed a lot of judicial energy and produced pointed opinions, yet ended with dismissal for mootness and no binding guidance on AEA use going forward.
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